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Only a Rite  
 
David Lee Miller 
 
 Only a rite, an endlessly repeated act, can commemorate this not very 
memorable encounter—for no one can say what the death of a child is, 
except the father qua father, that is to say, no conscious being. 
 
--Jacques Lacan, Four Fundamental Concepts 
 
 
On April 24, 1998, officials of Fayette county in central Kentucky exhumed an 
urn buried in Lot 508 at the Lexington Cemetery.  The urn, according to published 
reports, “contained only potting soil.”1  But the mystery surrounding this event does not 
concern a missing body—at least, not the sort of body that can be subject to autopsy. The 
urn-burial in question had been arranged the previous November by a North Carolina 
physician, Dr. Hollis Tidmore.  For ten years, friends and coworkers had grieved with Dr. 
Tidmore over the loss of a family he never had.  Late in 1997, as his “web of lies” began 
to unravel, Tidmore had the urn hastily buried.  His fraud was exposed, but newspaper 
accounts of the investigation suggest that something else remains to be unearthed: 
 
    It seemed so real to so many people. 
Dr. Hollis Tidmore had lost his wife and son in a car accident, and 
years later he was still grieving, distraught, and lonely. 
The Charlotte surgeon talked about it often.  Just a mention of that 
day—Aug. 21, 1987—could bring him to tears. 
Friends cried along with him, hoping he would heal someday. 
He marked the anniversary of the wreck each year by placing 
flowers in his church during Sunday services, recalls the Rev. Charles 
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Page, his friend and former pastor at First Baptist Church.  And every 
time, the doctor cried. 
But the sad story was a fiction. 
Tidmore never had a wife or son.  There was no wreck.  And the 
urn he buried in a Lexington cemetery contained only soil. 
 
Somewhere in the absurdities of this imposture resides a kind of truth—the one 
that made an imaginary father’s loss seem “so real to so many people.”  There 
was (to borrow Harry Berger’s phrase) no “encounter of fact,” only the utter 
redundancy of burying earth.  Yet the emptiness at the heart of this sad story 
makes it an unusually pure “encounter of meaning.”  The grief, the sympathy of 
friends, the ritualized commemoration during religious services, the consolations 
of mourning and the sense of community in sorrow, all these were merely 
symbolic, deprived of their anchor in the literal truth.  Yet in spite of the doctor’s 
bad faith they were also real, and so, in some sense, was his loss.  The sad story 
was false; but the true story is also sad.  Surely Hollis Tidmore was himself the 
wreck for which he wept. 
 The essays in this collection, together with the growing body of work, 
both theoretical and historical, that they cite and elaborate, reflect a surge of 
critical fascination with the sad stories we tell ourselves about grief and 
mourning.  The connection between grief and gender may not be intuitively 
obvious, but there is no question that the present critical preoccupation with loss, 
mourning, and elegy owes a great deal to gender theory.  Freud’s work, from the 
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essay “Mourning and Melancholia” (1917) through Beyond the Pleasure 
Principle (1919) to The Ego and the Id (1921), laid down a track, retraced in the 
speculations of Judith Butler and others, that leads from the process of mourning 
to the formation of gender.  In these works Freud projected an erotics of identity 
formation, a vision of sexual selfhood as resulting from the interplay between 
longing and identification in the child’s mournful response to the incest taboo.  It 
seems reasonable to suppose that grief in adults would call up the old mechanisms 
to repair new damage, rebuilding the self in the wake of a devastating blow.  The 
reconstruction of gender identity—opening it to history, and hence to revision—
would have to be part of this process, for sudden and profound loss shatters us to 
our foundations, wrenching us back to that archaic depth of being on which the 
sense of sexual selfhood first took shape.  Death renews the first loss; gender is 
what we became in response to that loss; mourning resumes that becoming, and  
in doing so opens us painfully to a future not yet engendered. 
 The connection between grief and gender also marks a point of 
convergence between the two most influential critical practices of our time, 
psychoanalysis and historicism.  As a primary stage of socialization, gender-
formation is ground zero for the construction of the social self; if mourning calls 
upon us to repeat the assumption of gender, it also calls us to rebuild our ties to 
the world around us, reweaving the filaments of collective identity.  Such a point 
of vulnerability and renewal must inevitably draw to itself the ideological forces 
and resources of its time and place, for it provides the human raw material on 
which they work.  Literature and criticism alike belong to this process. 
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 Literature and criticism belong to the process of renewal, but they also 
resist it.  Elegy imitates grief and mourning, and its mimesis must begin by 
recreating the sense of loss.  To the extent that this loss engages our fantasies and 
emotions it will also enlist our sympathy for the motives of resistance.  The elegy 
must create this resistance powerfully in order to overcome it convincingly: signs 
and ceremonies of mourning may bind us together socially, yet beneath that 
solidarity we feel the tug of a more inarticulate sympathy for the loss we cannot 
share, the stubborn clinging of the bereaved to the one who is deceased.  This 
must be one reason critical studies of the elegiac tradition, such as Jahan 
Ramanzani’s Poetry of Mourning, lay such emphasis on resistance:  consolation 
has to be authenticated by our faith in the uniqueness of each loss—in what 
Berger calls “its profound meaninglessness, transcending thought.”  Breaking 
more than a decade’s silence about the death of his son, Berger still declines to 
find meaning in it.  “Real death,” he insists, “marks the limits of literary death, of 
dialogue, of revision, of celebration.  Silence is its best rhetoric.” 
 W. Scott Howard, in his essay for this collection, keys on the resistance to 
consolation as a way of writing the literary history of the form.  Tracing in 
seventeenth-century texts what he calls “the true emergence of the modern poetic 
elegy,” he revises an argument taken over from Ramanzani, who distinguishes 
modern elegy from the tradition because the modern poet (in Howard’s words) 
“resists consolation, thereby performing oppositional cultural work through the 
elegy’s critique of the social conventions that govern private grief expression and 
public mourning practice.”  I suspect that unearned consolations are already 
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slipping back into this account through the very language of “oppositional cultural 
work,” which projects the elegiac poet as a wish-fulfilling image of the cultural 
critic.  But critics do identify with the poets they study, and for this reason 
criticism itself can be a highly specialized form of mourning.   
This is the burden of Harry Berger’s “Commencement Address: June 
1976,” a beautiful oration on the poetics of loss and consolation that embodies in 
its own carefully crafted form all the generic modulations Howard distinguishes 
in the elegiac tradition since the seventeenth century.  Berger’s “critique of the 
social conventions” is at once playful and serious, established immediately in the 
mock-antagonism with which he admonishes his audience that their celebration is 
premature.  His resistance to consolation lodges itself in the distinction between 
encounters of meaning and of fact.  We realize this distinction in loss, for there 
are no encounters of fact except in purely negative form.  Every living encounter 
mingles fact and meaning inseparably—as when a teenage son confronts his 
father in a relationship bedeviled by misunderstanding because it is fraught and 
over-fraught with contradictory meanings. Separation occurs through the 
irrevocable subtraction of death, which leaves us to choose between meaning and 
the silence into which that lost other has fallen.  Berger confronts this choice at 
the turning point of his elegy, and accepts it with moving simplicity:  “It 
happened to him, not to me.  I lost him, but he lost everything.  And that’s what 
has stayed with me.  That’s the fact.”  This is the moment of separation, the 
moment of letting go.  
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The distinction between fact and meaning registers this deeper separation.  
Freud famously speculated that melancholy involves “a loss of a more ideal 
kind,” observing with epigrammatic clarity that the patient “knows whom he has 
lost but not what he has lost in him.”2  The essays in this collection repeatedly 
find in the aftermath of separation a labor of interpretation that sorts through the 
meanings of loss and reinvests it with new significance: thus Martin Luther, in 
Patricia Phillipy’s essay, sees “political and social losses figured in or attendant 
upon” his daughter’s death; women in Anglo-Saxon texts after the Norman 
Invasion, as Claire Ingham shows, “bear the grief for a culture in transition.”  
Even resistance to meaning and its consolations takes on significance when, as 
Phillippy demonstrates, it serves to distinguish maternal grief from the public 
performance of masculine restraint.  Meanings are themselves forms and objects 
of desire, ideal ties that bind us on the one hand to those we have lost and on the 
other hand to the persons, communities, and ideals around us. 
Loss sets in motion an essentially textual process because it opens these 
meanings, the forms and objects of our deepest emotional investments, to 
revision.  Grief resists speech so intensely because silence is the only response 
that can preserve our absolute fidelity to the one we have lost in all his (and its) 
uniqueness.  To put loss into words is already to symbolize it, to renegotiate its 
meanings, to revise it—and, with it, ourselves.  Anne Prescott reminds us that 
Marguerite de Navarre, writing in the aftermath of her brother’s and her mother’s 
death, “has, at least to some degree, taken the liberty . . . to remake her now 
helpless relatives if not out-and-out Lutherans then more Erasmian, more 
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Evangelical, more like Marguerite.”  There is a kind of terrible freedom in this 
return to language—including, as the extreme example of Dr. Tidmore reminds 
us, the freedom to refashion ourselves through lies.  In his fantasy of mourning, 
Hollis Tidmore became a husband, a father, and an object of pity.  In her fantasy, 
Marguerite makes her brother more like herself and herself more like him, 
adopting “the person of a male lover” to explore the significance of her loss.   
This freedom to revise ourselves and remake others in the aftermath of 
grief is real, but not absolute.  Marshall Grossman invokes the psychoanalytic 
model of transference as a way of understanding the rhetorical structures through 
which mourning negotiates ideal losses and reconfigures the emotions they 
release.  Transference counterbalances the awful freedom that we purchase at the 
cost of our dearest loves; its tropes suspend a thread of continuity across the 
radical discontinuity of separation.  Between the absolute severance of death and 
the persistence of love borne across death by the rhetorical structures of the 
transference, we locate one possibility for what Berger calls “celebration,” at once 
a separation and a return. 
Among the defining features of the modern elegy as Howard describes it 
are “a heightened sense of the linguistic negotiation of loss” and “the placement 
of consolation within the context of human temporality.”  Berger’s oration fuses 
these elements deftly, taking death into itself formally through the motifs of 
separation and timing, which it then carefully manages in order to create a sense 
of closure and decorum.  First the speaker sets himself apart from his audience by 
declaring their celebration premature.  Then, against the prematurity of their 
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expectations, he opposes deliberate gestures of delay.  He mentions the 
“encounter of fact” almost at once, but postpones any explanation in favor of “the 
worm and the word.”  The worm, too, is introduced only to be deferred: “I’m not 
ready to talk about it yet.”  So, again, is the word: the speaker will celebrate, he 
will rejoice and make merry with his listeners, but “not yet.”  First he must insist 
on separation: on his own isolation from the students behind him and the parents 
in front of him; on the distinctness of his four encounters, each introduced only to 
be suspended, held apart in the mind until he is ready for them all to come 
together; and on the separateness of events in time that allows for celebration in 
its root sense, as a revisiting of what is past. 
All these separations are artfully overcome in the oration as the absolute 
rift between Harry and Tommy is, simply, accepted.  “I have let go,” says the 
speaker.  In letting go he has taken the risk that Ryder avoided and that Socrates’ 
companions resisted:  “they’re afraid to go away from themselves, let themselves 
go, risk losses.”  But without the risk of discontinuity, even in its extreme form as 
the shattering experience of a loved person’s death, we cannot open ourselves to 
history or change, and so we cannot celebrate.  Only after he lets go in this way 
can the speaker move to his peroration.  Only then can he rediscover the decorum 
of the occasion, the propriety of mingling elegy with commencement, and in 
doing so, rejoin the audience from which he has held himself aloof:  “When I 
think of Tommy,” he can say, “it makes me more joyous now to be standing here 
with good friends and with those students whom I’ve come to know well, and 
who mean much to me, and with whom I’ve wanted to share this encounter.”  At 
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this moment, the “encounter of fact” yields, as it must, not to mere “encounters of 
meaning,” but to what he calls the act of education and love, the living moment in 
which meaning and fact, like self and other, are not only separate, but also 
inseparable. 
 
                                                
1 All quotations are cited from the account of Blair Anthony Roberts of the Knight 
Ridder News Service, as published in the Lexington Herald-Leader (Monday, July 27, 
1998), B1 and B3. 
2 Sigmund Freud, “Mourning and Melancholia,” in The Standard Edition of the 
Complete Works, trans. James Strachey (London: Hogarth, 1955), 14: 245. 
